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PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY -The First Amendment's Protec-
tion of Commercial Speech and Lawyer Advertising -McLellan v.
Mississippi State Bar Association, 413 So. 2d 705 (Miss. 1982).
In October of 1979 a formal complaint was filed by the Com-
plaint Tribunal of the Mississippi State Bar against William E.
McLellan, III, alleging violation of the Mississippi Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility for causing the publication of an
advertisement1 in the yellow pages of the Jackson, Mississippi
telephone book.' It was further alleged that these actions constituted
a violation of Disciplinary Rule (DR) 2-101[A], DR 2-101[B],
and DR 2-102[A] [8].' In November of the same year McLellan
1. A copy of the advertisement may be found in Appendix I.
2. McLellan v. Mississippi State Bar Ass'n, 413 So. 2d 705 (Miss. 1982).
3. Id. at 706. The relevant parts of those sections of the MIssissIPPI CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY are:
(i) DR 2-101[A] (1977):
A lawyer shall not prepare, cause to be prepared, use, or participate in the use of, any
form of public communication that contains professionally self-laudatory statements
calculated to attract lay clients.
(2) DR 2-10l[B] (1977):
A lawyer shall not publicize himself, his partner, or associate as a lawyer through
newspaper (except as provided in DR 2-102[A] 17] and [8]) or magazine, advertisements,
radio or television announcements, display advertisements in city or telephone direc-
tories or other means of commercial publicity,...
(3) DR 2-102[A] (1977):
A lawyer or lay firm shall not use professional cards, professional announcement cards,
office signs, letterheads, telephone directory listings, law lists, legal directory listings,
or similar professional notices or devices, except that the following may be used if they
are in dignified form:....
[8] Publication of a notice in a newspaper having general circulation in the county
where the advertising attorney maintains an office advertising the availability of routine
legal services as defined herein and the fees to be charged therefor. The advertise-
ment must include the following and only the following: Name, including name of
law firm, office address and telephone number, one or more routine legal services,
as defined herein, which are offered and the fixed fee to be charged therefor. Said
notice may also include the names of lawyers in the firm.
Said advertisement shall be of a dignified size and all information allowed by this
rule therein shall be printed in no larger than twelve point type.
All advertisements shall contain the following statement in type no smaller than the
largest size type used therein: "The Code of Professional Responsibility of the
Mississippi State Bar requires that the above services be performed for not more
than the advertised fee."
The term, "routine legal services," as used herein, shall be limited to the following:
[1] Uncontested divorces.
[2] Uncontested adoptions.
[3] Uncontested personal bankruptcies.
[4] Change of name.
15] Deeds.
[6] Promissory notes.
[7] Security agreements and deeds of trust.
[8] Powers of attorney.
[9] Individual income tax returns.
[10] Bills of sale.
[11] Wills.
[12] Initial conference with clients.
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answered the complaint and admitted the publication of the adver-
tisement in question but denied any violation of any disciplinary
rule." McLellan then affirmatively alleged that any sections of the
Code of Professional Responsibility which prohibited his adver-
tisement were violative of his constitutional rights.'
One year later, the Complaint Tribunal issued its findings
of fact and ruling. The Tribunal found that McLellan's advertise-
ment violated the Disciplinary Rules of the State Bar Association
and that the rules did not impinge on McLellan's constitutional
rights.6 The Tribunal's final determination was that McLellan
should be publicly reprimanded by way of a sanction. 7 McLellan
appealed as a matter of right to the Mississippi Supreme Court.'
Although the McLellan case is one of first impression in
Mississippi, the issue of professional advertising and the com-
mercial speech protections afforded by the United States Constitu-
tion has undergone extensive review in other jurisdictions. The
recent case law has sharpened the law in this area to the point
that the court had only one logical way to decide the case, that
being in favor of the appellant, William E. McLellan, III.
COMMERCIAL SPEECH - INTRODUCTION
The historical explanation for the development of the ban on
lawyer advertising is not clear. Henry S. Drinker contends that
young affluent men in England came to the Inns of Court to eat
dinner and study to become barristers.' Drinker states that these
young men regarded the study and practice of law to hold as much
honor and dignity as a seat in Parliament."0 They believed the pro-
fession did not need nor want solicitation because of the fraternal
characteristics it maintained and exhibited."
The profession and its brethrenly protocol began its spread
to the United States when young men from Boston, New York,
Philadelphia, and the South went to study at the Inns of Court.12
Failure to perform an advertised service at the advertised fee for a person responding to the adver-
tisement shall be misleading advertising and deceptive practice.
4. Abstract of Record at 2, Brief of the Appellant at 10, McLellan v. Mississippi State Bar
Ass'n, 413 So. 2d 705 (Miss. 1982).
5. 413 So. 2d at 706.
6. Brief of the Appellant at 4, McLellan v. Mississippi State Bar Ass'n, 413 So. 2d 705 (Miss.
1982).
7. Abstract of Record at 2, McLellan v. Mississippi State Bar Ass'n, 413 So. 2d 705 (Miss.
1982).
8. Miss. CODE ANN. § 73-3-319(b) (1972).
9. H. DINKER, LEGAL ETHIcs 201 (1953).
10. Id.
11. Id. at 212.
12. Id. at 5.
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Upon return these men became the leaders of the American Bar,
adhering to the traditions of honor and dignity that surrounded
the practice of law in England" and which prohibited advertising.
In the past century in our country this tradition weakened.
A mounting force emerged from a long series of cases dealing
with the authority of the States to control certain forms of adver-
tising and the constitutional application of the first amendment
to commercial speech. The primary attacks on the tradition came
under the first amendment and free speech " while the secondary
attacks came via the fourteenth amendment" and its equal pro-
tection clause. These attacks on professional advertising controls
and commercial speech limitations subsequently led to the land-
mark case of Bates v. State Bar of Arizona 6 where the estab-
lished ban on lawyer advertising was broken against what had
been almost a century of constitutional onslaught. The true ef-
fects of the Bates decision remain to be seen.
PPE-Bates
As was noted above, historically, lawyer advertising has been
shunned and prohibited. There were, however, no express pro-
hibitions against lawyer advertising until 1908, when the American
Bar Association adopted its Canons of Professional Ethics.1 Canon
27 of this first code of ethics included the following practices as
unprofessional: "the solicitation of employment by circulars, adver-
tisements, 'touters,' unwarranted personal communications, the
inspiring of favorable newspaper comments, publication of
photographs or any form of self-laudation."'
One of the chief purposes of Canon 27's prohibition of adver-
tising involved the preservation of professional standards in the
practice of law. The primary fear was that advertising would erode
dignity traditionally associated with the profession."9 While Bates
dispelled this longstanding belief,2" the early case law relied upon
13. Id.
14. See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748 (1976).
15. See, e.g., Sherman v. State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 116 S.W. 2d 843 (1938).
16. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
17. H. DRINKER, supra note 9, at 215.
18. Id.
19. Bates, 433 U.S. at 368. See also, People v. MacCabe, 18 Colo. 186, 187, 32 P. 280 (1893).
There the court said "[t]he ethics of the legal profession forbid that an attorney advertise his talents
or skills as a shopkeeper advertises his wares." Id.
20. 433 U.S. at 368. "But we find the postulated connection between advertising and the ero-
sion of true professionalism to be severely strained. At its core, the argument presumes that at-
torneys must conceal from themselves and from their clients the real-life fact that lawyers earn
their livelihood at the bar." Id.
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this belief to prohibit lawyer advertising as well as other profes-
sional and commercial advertising against constitutional
challenges.
In In re Cohen,21 the lawyer, purporting to be a specialist in
marital problems, advertised free legal advice in several Boston
newspapers.2" The court, in response to Cohen's arguments which
relied upon first amendment freedoms, said "[w]hatever may be
his constitutional rights, a member of the bar must conduct himself
as an officer of the court in such manner as not to offend against
reasonable rules of propriety established by the court for the
general welfare.""3
Similarly, in Semler v. Oregon State Board of Dental Ex-
aminers," a state prohibition against certain types of advertising
and solicitation by dentists withstood constitutional challenge.
Semler, a practicing dentist in Portland, Oregon, brought an ac-
tion to enjoin the enforcement of the Oregon legislation calling
for the revocation of his license to practice for unprofessional
conduct."3 Semler alleged the statute was violative of the due pro-
cess and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment"
as "an arbitrary interference with liberty and property... ."7 The
statute was upheld in the Supreme Court of Oregon 8 and the case
was then appealed to the United States Supreme Court. The Court
affirmed the Oregon court's decision stating that the state has an
interest in the protection of the public" against "unwarranted and
misleading claims.., even though in particular instances there
might be no actual deception or misstatement.""
Among other things, what Semler has shown is that a
challenge to a state advertising statute resting on the equal pro-
tection clause is generally not strong enough to override the state's
policy for the legislative enactment. Initially, the courts give
greater weight to the enactment by presuming it to be within con-
stitutional limitations. 1 Additionally, "[a statute] will not be set
21. 159 N.E. 495 (1928).
22. Id. at 496.
23. Id. at 497.
24. 294 U.S. 608 (1935).
25. The unprofessional conduct amounting to grounds for revocation of license in this case in-
cluded "[a]dvertising professional superiority or the performance of professional services in a
superior manner [and] advertising prices for professional service...." Semler, 294 U.S. at 609.
26. 294 U.S. at 609.
27. Id. at 611.
28. 148 Or. 50, 34 P.2d 311.
29. 294 U.S. at 612.
30. Id. at 613.
31. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 247 (1970) (Brennan, White, and Marshall, JJ., dissent-
ing in part, concurring in part).
[Vol. 3:235
19831 PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY-LAWYER ADVERTISING 239
aside as the denial of equal protection of the laws if any state of
facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it." 2 Thus, this
method or strategy for challenging state advertising and solicita-
tion statutes became futile and a new basis of attack arose: the
first amendment.
The first amendment of the Constitution of the United States
prohibits legislative interference in the right to freedom of speech."
While in theory this right seems unquestionable," ' in practice the
judiciary has found many instances to determine that the first
amendment right is not absolute. 5
In Valentine v. Chrestensen,36 the U.S. Supreme Court was
called upon to determine whether advertising should be afforded
protection under the first amendment. The Court upheld a
municipal ordinance which prohibited the distribution of "any
handbill, circular.., or other advertising matter whatsoever in or
upon any street or public place... ."" In reaching its conclusion
the Court also enunciated what has since been labeled the "com-
mercial speech doctrine":
This court has unequivocally held that the streets are proper places for the exer-
cise of the freedom of communicating information and disseminating opinion
and that though the states and municipalities may appropriately regulate the
privilege in the public interest, they may not unduly burden or proscribe its
employment in these public thoroughfares. We are equally clear that the Con-
stitution imposes no such restraint on government as respects purely commer-
cial advertising.
In other words, commercial speech is outside the protection of
the first amendment. The approach which denied commercial
speech protection was never echoed 9 following the decision in
Breard v. Alexandria,"° where the Court further supported the com-
32. Metropolitan Casualty Insurance Co. v. Brownell, 294 U.S. 580, 584 (1934).
33. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the peo-
ple peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S.
CONST. Amend. I.
The first amendment of the Constitution of the United States has been found applicable to
the several states through the fourteenth amendment. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
34. See, e.g., Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U.L. REV. 865 (1960); Meiklejohn, The First
Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SuP. CT. REV. 245.
35. See, e.g., Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 561 (1948); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321
U.S. 158, 166 (1944); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 109-10 (1943); Chaplinsky v.
New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04
(1940).
36. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
37. Id. at 53 n.1.
38. Id. at 54 (emphasis added).
39. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 759.
40. 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
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mercial speech exception to first amendment protection. The com-
mercial speech doctrine enunciated by the Court in Valentine was
not well taken by subsequent decisions of the Court"' and was
essentially avoided in Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Com-
mission on Human Relations.4
The Pittsburgh Press Co., in violation of an ordinance, printed
in a newspaper sexually discriminatory "help-wanted" adver-
tisements. "3 The newspaper company listed employment adver-
tisements in sex-designated columns according to the employer-
advertiser's wishes. The newspaper contended that the ordinance
was violative of first amendment rights."' The Court upheld the
statute on the grounds that discriminatory advertising was illegal
commercial activity, " not on the basis that commercial speech
is unprotected, as under Valentine."6
The commercial speech doctrine was finally put to rest in
Bigelow v. Virginia. 7 Bigelow, managing editor of a weekly
newspaper in Charlottesville, Virginia allowed an advertisement
for an abortion referral service in New York City to be pub-
lished. Bigelow was convicted of advertising abortions. 8 The
Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the conviction, 9 rejecting
Bigelow's first amendment claim on the ground that the adver-
tisement was a "commercial advertisement" and thus could be sub-
jected to government regulation."s The U.S. Supreme Court re-
versed the state court's holding5" stating "[o]ur cases... clearly
established that speech is not stripped of First Amendment pro-
tection merely because it appears in that form. " "
With the commercial speech doctrine on the shelf and the court
41. The ruling in Valentine has been labeled "casual, almost offhand." Cammarano v. United
States, 358 U.S. 498, 514 (1958) (Douglas, J., concurring). See also, Lehman v. City of Shaker
Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 314 n.6 (1974), where four dissenting Justices expressed doubts as to
the validity of the Valentine decision.
42. 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
43. Id. at 379.
44. Id. at 381.
45. Id. at 388.
46. Id. at 389. Mr. Justice Powell intimates at the notion that some advertising could override
a governmental interest. "Any First Amendment interest which might be served by advertising
an ordinary commercial proposal and which might arguably outweigh the governmental interest
supporting the regulation is altogether absent when the commercial activity itself is illegal... ."Id.
at 389.
47. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
48. Id. at 811.
49. Bigelow v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. 191, 191 S.E.2d 173 (1962).
50. Id. at 195, 191 S.E.2d at 176.
51. 421 U.S. at 818. "The central assumption made by the Supreme Court of Virginia was
that the First Amendment guarantees of speech and press are inapplicable to paid commercial
advertisements." Id. at 818.
52. Id.
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now applying a balancing test between first amendment rights and
the public interests sought to be protected by the challenged statute,
the Court opened the door to a new breed of challenges: whether
the "professional" may advertise."3
One year after Bigelow the Supreme Court was faced precisely
with that issue in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council." This case came to the Court on
grounds somewhat different from the statutory challenges
previously discussed. In the previous cases the action was either
brought against or brought by the "advertiser" who had com-
municated the advertisement. Conversely, in this case it was the
consumer, the recipient of the advertisement, who commenced
the suit.5
The prescription drug consumers brought suit to enjoin the
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy and the individual members
of that Board from enforcing a statute 6 which provided that phar-
macists licensed in Virginia were guilty of unprofessional con-
duct if they advertised prescription drug prices. s' The consumers
contended that the first amendment entitled them "to receive in-
formation that pharmacists wish[ed] to communicate to them
through advertising.., concerning the prices of [prescription]
drugs." 8 The State Board on the other hand argued that the statute
provided a means of maintaining the professional image of the
pharmacist, a legitimate state interest, 9 and that commercial speech
is unprotected by the first amendment.6
The Court reviewed the cases that had developed and those
that had eventually eroded the commercial speech doctrine and
found that "speech does not lose its First Amendment protection
because money is spent to project it ... . If there is a kind of com-
53. The balancing test can be gleaned from the dictum of United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S.
367, 377 (1968) and United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 582-83 (1968).
54. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
55. Id. at 753. As a matter of right the Court stated that "[i]f there is a right to advertise, there
is a reciprocal right to receive the advertising... ." Id. at 757.
56. Id. at 748.
57. Any pharmacist shall be considered guilty of unprofessional conduct who (1) is found guilty
of any crime involving grave moral turpitude, or is guilty of fraud or deceit in obtaining a cer-
tificate of registration; or (2) issues, publishes, broadcasts by radio, or otherwise, or distributes
or uses in anyway whatsoever advertising matter in which statements are made about his profes-
sional service which have a tendency to deceive or defraud the public, contrary to the public health
and welfare; or (3) publishes, advertises or promotes, directly or indirectly, in any manner what-
soever, any amount, price, fee, premium, discount, rebate or credit terms for professional ser-
vices or for drugs containing narcotics or for any drugs which may be dispensed only by prescription.
VA. CODE ANN. § 54-524.35 (1974).
58. 425 U.S. at 754. See also, note 55 supra.
59. Id. at 766-67.
60. Id. at 758.
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mercial speech that lacks all First Amendment protection.., it must
be distinguished by its content... [not] simply be speech on a com-
mercial subject." 1
In addition, the Court reasoned that the consumers' right to
know prevailed over a state's interest in maintenance of profes-
sional standards.6 2 The majority, realizing the possible implica-
tions this decision might have on other professional advertising,
explicitly distinguished physicians and lawyers as not within the
scope of the opinion 3 and reserved decision" on those profes-
sions for future determination.
The majority's realization of the implications of the Virginia
State Board of Pharmacy decision became an actual determina-
tion in Bates,"s where two lawyers, John R. Bates and Van
O'Steen, advertised' in a newspaper in violation of DR 2-101(B). 7
Bates
Bates and O'Steen sought review in the Supreme Court of
Arizona following a recommendation by the Board of Governors
of the State Bar that both be suspended for one week. They con-
tended that the disciplinary rule violated sections 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act because it limited competition and that the rule was
violative of first amendment rights. 8 The Arizona court rejected
both contentions.
On appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, Bates
and O'Steen sought review of the same issues heard in the court
below. The Court in the first half of the opinion affirmed the an-
titrust section of the lower court's decision. 9 The second half of
the opinion, dealing with the first amendment issue, or more
specifically "whether lawyers ... may constitutionally advertise
61. Id. at 761.
62. Id. at 763-70.
63. Id. at 773 n.25.
64. Id. at 773.
65. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
66. A copy of the advertisement can be found in Appendix II of this Note.
67. ARiz. REV. STAT. SUP. CT. R. 29(a), DR 2-101(B) (Supp. 1977) provided:
A lawyer shall not publicize himself, or his partner, or associate, or any other lawyer affliated
with him or his-firm, as a lawyer through newspaper or magazine advertisements, radio or televi-
sion announcements, display advertisements in the city or telephone directories or other means
of commercial publicity, nor shall he authorize or permit others to do so in his behalf.
68. 433 U.S. at 356.
69. Id. at 352. The Court relied on Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943), which held that
the Sherman Act does not prohibit rules imposing restraint which are imposed by the state acting
in a sovereign capacity. Similarly, in Bates it is Arizona, in its sovereign capacity, imposing the
restraint; thus the Parker exemption applies and bars the Sherman Act contention. Id. at 359.
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the prices [of] certain routine services...,""° was structured ac-
cording to the six proffered justifications for restricting
such advertising.
First, the Arizona Bar feared that price advertising would have
an adverse effect on the pride, dignity and self-worth of the legal
profession and the public image thereof. 1 The Court rejected this
argument taking a realist's attitude on how the public really views
the profession. Moreover, after reviewing studies on the legal pro-
fession, the Court suggested that advertising might expel some
of the cynicism that failure to advertise could have created."3
Second, it was argued that advertising of legal services would
be misleading. It was contended that because legal services are
so individualized the consumer would not be able to determine
the legal services he requires on the basis of an advertisement.
The Court's response was that since only routine services under
familiar topic headings such as uncontested divorces, simple adop-
tions, uncontested personal bankruptcy and change of names would
be advertised, that there could be no misinterpretation."" Also the
Court considered this contention to underestimate the public's
knowledge. As in Virginia State Board of Pharmacys the Court
viewed "as dubious any justification that is based on the benefits
of public ignorance. " '
Third, the Bar feared that advertising would stir up litiga-
tion. The Court recognized this fear as probable but took notice
of a possible benefit in advertising by attorneys, since recent
studies showed an underutilization of the legal profession. Adver-
tising might prompt the person wronged to seek compensation
by legal action where he would have been silent without it.
Fourth, the Court dismissed the claim that advertising would
increase the profession's overhead costs and that such costs would
be ultimately passed on to the consumer."" The Court pointed to
"revealing evidence" which actually found just the opposite; where
70. 433 U.S. at 367-68.
71. Id. at 368. See also, notes 19 & 20 supra and accompanying text.
72. 433 U.S. at 370-71 nn. 22-23. The Court cited from the A.B.A.'s Revised Handbook on
Prepaid Legal Services (1972) which stated on page 26: "We are persuaded that the actual or
feared price of such services coupled with a sense of unequal bargaining status is a significant
barrier to wider utilization of legal services." The Court was also influenced by a report which
suggested that people do not seek legal assistance because they have no way to know which lawyer
is competent to handle their problem. See ABA, Legal Services & the Public, 3 ALTERNATIVES
15 (Jan. 1976).
73. 433 U.S. at 371-72.
74. Id. at 372-73.
75. See 425 U.S. at 769-70.
76. 433 U.S. at 375.
77. Id. at 375-77.
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there was price advertising the retail prices were lower than they
would be without advertising."8
Fifth, the Bar claimed that advertising would lead to a stan-
dardization of the profession thereby lowering the quality of ser-
vices performed by the attorney. The Court reasoned that adver-
tising will not prevent inferior services because a lawyer "inclined
to cut quality will do so regardless of the rule on advertising. 7 9
As to the final claim that enforcement would be difficult, the
Court said that most attorneys would be "honest and straightfor-
ward," and that it would be in their best interest to protect against
those who were not.80
In conclusion, the majority held the Arizona Disciplinary Rule
banning all advertising by attorneys violated the first amendment. 1
The Court clarified the limits of its holding by stating that this
decision did not remove lawyer advertising from regulation and
that false or misleading statements, claims of superior quality,
and in-person solicitation were all subject to restraint as well as
the time, place and manner of the advertising." The cases that
followed Bates dealt precisely with these issues."
PosT-Bates
Because of the Bates decision lawyers are now permitted to
advertise subject to the particular restraints set out by their par-
ticular state bar association's Professional Code of Responsibli-
ty. The degree of permissiveness in lawyer advertising varies from
state to state. On the other hand, all states still hold that misleading
or false advertising, self-laudatory claims and in-person solicita-
78. See, Benham, The Effect of Advertising on the Price of Eyeglasses, 15 J.L. & EcON. 337
(1972). This study found the prices of eyeglasses to be substantially lower in states that allowed
advertising compared to those states that prohibited advertising.
79. 433 U.S. at 378.
80. Id. at 379.
81. Id. at 384.
82. Id. at 383-84.
83. The Bates method of case analysis of commercial speech cases was expanded in Central
Hudson Gas & Electric v. Public Service Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S. 557 (1979) against
strong criticism from Bates majority opinion writer Justice Blackmun. The Central Hudson Gas
decision provided a four-part analysis for commercial speech cases:
[W]e must [first] determine whether the expression is protected by the First Amendment. For
commercial speech to come within that provision, it at least must concern lawful activity and
not be misleading. Next, we ask whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial.
If both inquiries yield positive answers, we must determine whether the regulation directly
advances the governmental interest asserted, and whether it is more extensive than is necessary
to serve that interest.
Id. at 566. The Central Hudson Gas analysis was subsequently followed in Metromedia, Inc.
v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981), a plurality opinion.
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tion are unprofessional conduct. The latter of these prohibited
forms of advertising, in-person solicitation, was the subject of
debate in two Supreme Court cases handed down on the same
day, Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association4 and In re Primus."
The Ohralik case presents the classic example of" 'ambulance
chasing' fraught with obvious potential for misrepresentation and
overreaching." 6 Shortly after an automobile accident Ohralik ap-
proached two hospitalized young women, both 18 years of age.
Upon his second visit to the hospital room of one of the victims
he obtained a signed contingent-fee arrangement. Shortly
thereafter, he obtained an oral agreement to a contingent-fee ar-
rangement with the second victim at her home on the day she was
released from the hospital. Ohralik was never invited either to
the hospital or to the home.
Both young women eventually discharged Ohralik but he suc-
ceeded in recovering a settlement on a breach of contract suit
against them. The two women then filed a grievance against
Ohralik with the county bar association. The Board found his con-
duct violative of DR 2-103(A) and DR 2-104 (A) of the Ohio Code
of Professional Responsibility. 7 The Ohio Supreme Court found
on appeal that his conduct was not constitutionally protected and
the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed that judgment.8
In Primus, Edna Smith Primus, a cooperating lawyer with
the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), was requested to
address a group of women who had been sterilized as a condition
to continued receipt of medical assistance under the medicaid pro-
gram. Primus accepted and advised those who attended the meeting
of their legal rights and suggested the possibility of a lawsuit.
Shortly thereafter Primus was informed that one of the women
who had attended the meeting wished to bring suit against the
physician who had sterilized her. Primus then wrote this woman
84. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
85. In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
86. Id. at 469.
87. DR 2-103(A) of the Ohio Code (1970) provides: 'A lawyer shall not recommend employ-
ment, as a private practitioner, of himself, his partner, or associate to a non-lawyer who has not
sought his advice regarding employment of a lawyer.'
DR 2-104(A) (1970) provides in relevant part: 'A lawyer who has given unsolicited advice to
a layman that he should obtain counsel or take legal action shall not accept employment resulting
from that advice, except that: (1) A lawyer may accept employment by a close friend, relative,
former client (if advice is germane to the former employment), or one whom the lawyer reasonably
believes to be a client.'
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 453 n.9 (1978).
88. Id. at 449-54.
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a letter offering free legal advice. This letter was the subject of
the litigation.
The Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline
of the Supreme Court of South Carolina (Board) filed a formal
complaint containing charges of unethical conduct in violation of
DR 2-103(D)(5)(a) and (c) 9 and DR 2-104(A)(5).9" The Board
issued a private reprimand and the Supreme Court of South
Carolina adopted the Board's findings.91 The United States
Supreme Court reversed, finding South Carolina's application of
its disciplinary rules to Primus' letter violative of the first and four-
92teenth amendments.
On first appearance both Primus and Ohralik, both involv-
ing solicitation issues, appear equivalent. But a closer look reveals
the Court placed the weight of its decision on the substance of
the solicitation, which is where the parity between the cases ends.
The Court first distinguished Ohralik from Primus based upon
the acts of solicitation. 3 Ohralik was reprimanded because he tried
to attract business by in-person solicitation. The Court, in con-
demning such activities, said that because of the evils associated
89. The relevant parts of South Carolina's DR 2-103(D) provide:
(D) A lawyer shall not knowingly assist a person or organization that recommends, furnishes,
or pays for legal services to promote the use of his service or those of his partners or associates.
However, he may cooperate in a dignified manner with the legal service activities of any of the
following, provided that his independent professional judgement is exercised in behalf of his client
without interference or control by any organization or other person: ....
(5) Any other non-profit organization that recommends, furnishes, or pays for legal services to
its members or beneficiaries, but only in those instances and to the extent that controlling con-
stitutional interpretation at the time of rendition of the services requires the allowance of such
legal service activities, and only if the following conditions, unless prohibited by such interpreta-
tion, are met:
(a) The primary purposes of such organization do not include the rendition of legal services....
(c) Such organization does not derive a financial benefit from the rendition of legal services
by the lawyer.
S.C. SuP. CT. DR 2-103 (D), quoted in In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 418 n.10 (1978).
90. The relevant part of South Carolina's DR 2-104(A) provides:
(A) A lawyer who has given unsolicited advice to a layman that he should obtain counsel or take
legal action shall not accept employment resulting from that advice, except that: ....
(5) If success in asserting rights or defenses of his client in litigation in the nature of a class
action is dependent upon the joinder of others, a lawyer may accept, but shall not seek, employ-
ment from those contacted for the purpose of obtaining their joinder.
S.C. SUP. CT. DR 2-104(A), quoted in In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 413 n.ll (1978).
91. In re Smith, 268 S.C. 259, 233 S.E.2d 301 (1977).
92. In re Primus, 436 U.S. at 439.
93. Id. at 422.
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with in-person solicitation,94 the state has a legitimate and com-
pelling interest in preventing solicitation. '
In Primus the act of solicitation was a letter. In this instance
the Court stated that the record failed to show any of the evils
traditionally associated with in-person solicitation."6 Additional-
ly the Court distinguished the cases on the basis that in Ohralik
the in-person solicitation was for pecuniary gain while in Primus
the attorney's actions on the behalf of the ACLU were for a
political tenet rather than a pecuniary interest."' While the Supreme
Court was hearing and then deciding Ohralik and Primus another
lawyer advertising issue, misleading advertising, had begun in
the Midwest.
In 1978, R.M.J., a lawyer admitted to both Missouri and Il-
linois Bars, as a means of announcing his solo practice in St. Louis
mailed out professional announcement cards and placed several
advertisements in the local newspapers and the telephone
directory.98 Subsequently, the Advisory Committee9 filed an in-
formation charging R.M.J. with unprofessional conduct in viola-
tion of Rule 4 of the Missouri Supreme Court00 regulating adver-
tising by lawyers.
The information charged that in several ways the language
used in R.M.J.'s advertisements deviated from the prescribed areas
of practice allowable in a published advertisement:0 1 it listed the
94. See, e.g., Note, Advertising, Solicitation and the Profession's Duty to Make Legal Counsel
Available, 91 YALE L. J. 1181 (1972). "Advertising and solicitation, ... would encourage lawyers
to engage in overreaching, overcharging, underrepresentation, and misrepresentation." Id. at 1184;
Comment, A Critical Analysis of Rules Against Solicitation by Laywers, 25 U. Cm. L. REV. 674,
682-85 (Summer 1958).
95. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 462.
96. Id. at 434-35.
97. Id. at 422.
98. In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 196 (1982). A copy of the advertisements in question in this
case can be found in Appendix III of this Note.
99. The Advisory Committee has the authority to act on behalf of the Missouri State Bar to
investigate, institute and prosecute suits for the unauthorized practice of law. Mo. RULEs OF COURT,
RULE 5.05 (1982).
100. 455 U.S. at 196.
101. As of November 13, 1977 the Advisory Committee provided two methods of listing
areas of practice in the advertisements. The rule provided in relevant part as follows:
The following area for fields of law may be advertised by use of the specific language
hereinafter set out:
1. General Civil Practice
2. General Criminal Practice
3. General Civil and Criminal Practice
If a lawyer or law firm uses one of the above, no other area can be used .... If one
of the above is not used, then a lawyer or law firm can use one or more of the following:
1. Administrative Law
2. Anti-Trust Law
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
courts in which he was admitted to practice, although this was
not within the ten prescribed categories of information autho-
rized by Rule 4;1°' it failed to include a disclaimer of certification
as required; °" it violated DR 2-101(A)(2) for sending announce-
ment cards to "persons other than lawyers, clients, former clients,
personal friends, and relatives." R.M.J. argued that each of these
restrictions, with the exception of the disclaimer, was unconstitu-
tional under the first and fourteenth amendments."' The Supreme
Court of Missouri summarily upheld the constitutionality of Rule
4 of the same court and failed to discuss DR 2-102 dealing with
announcement cards in its issuance of a private reprimand.0 5
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the lower court's holding
in a unanimous decision. The Court, citing the Bates decision,
found that although the states retain the authority to regulate com-
mercial speech, such as professional advertising, they may do so
3. Appellate Practice
4. Bankruptcy
5. Commercial Law
6. Corporation Law and Business
7. Criminal Law
8. Eminent Domain Law
9. Environmental Law
10. Family Law
11. Financial Institution Law
12. Insurance Law
13. Labor Law
14. Local Government Law
15. Military Law
16. Probate and Trust Law
17. Property Law
18. Public Utility Law
19. Taxation Law
20. Tort Law
21. Trial Practice
22. Worker's Compensation Law
No deviation from the above phraseology will be permitted and no statement of limitation
of practice can be stated.
If one or more of these specific areas of practice are used in any advertisement, the
following statement must be included . . . . Listing of the above areas of practice does
not indicate any certification of expertise therein.
VERNON'S ANN. Mo. RULES, Rule 4, Addendum III (Adv. Comm. No. 13), quoted in In re
R.M.J., 455 U.S. 195, 196 n.6.
102. Part B of DR 2-101 of Rule 4 states that "a lawyer may publish .. .the following
information in newspapers, periodicals and the yellow pages of telephone directories":
Name, address, telephone number; areas or fields of practice; date and place of
birth; schools attended, degrees received; foreign language ability; office hours;
initial consultation fee; availability of a schedule of fees; credit arrangements for
fees; and fixed fees charged for "specific routine legal services."
Mo. RULES OF COURT, Rule 4, DR 2-101(B) (1982).
103. See supra note 101.
104. 455 U.S. at 198.
105. In re R.M.J., 609 S.W.2d 411, 412 (Mo. 1981).
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only as far as is reasonably necessary to further substantial
interests." In addition, the Court held that R.M.J.'s deviations
from the prescribed listed areas of practice were not misleading
since, for example, using the words "real estate" instead of "prop-
erty" could scarcely mislead the public. As to the listing of the
jurisdictions in which he was licensed to practice, the Court found
this information to be relevant in view of the geography of the
region and not misleading in any way."°' The Court did find that
the listing by the attorney in large, boldface letters that he was
a member of the bar of the Supreme Court of the United States
was in "bad taste" but not misleading."' ° Finally, the Court held
the announcement cards could not be absolutely prohibited sim-
ply because of the difficulty of supervision of this type of
solicitation. '
THE McLellan DECISION
Following the Bates decision, the Mississippi State Bar (Bar)
amended the Mississippi Code of Professional Responsibility to
comply with that decision. While most states took a liberal, per-
missive view of lawyer advertising after Bates," ° Mississippi
adhered to a conservative, restrictive basis and permitted
newspaper advertising only, subject to strict limitations.1 This
adherence can be attributed to a desire on the part of the Bar to
maintain the dignity and honor traditionally associated with the
legal profession. 1 However, where constancy becomes unwar-
ranted constriction, the advertiser must prevail.
106. In summarizing the present state of the commercial speech doctrine the Court made
the following statement:
Truthful advertising related to lawful activities is entitled to the protection of the First
Amendment. But when the particular content or method of the advertising suggests that
it is inherently misleading or when experience has proven that in fact such advertising
is subject to abuse, the states may impose appropriate restrictions. Misleading advertising
may be prohibited entirely. But the states may not place an absolute prohibition on certain
types of potentially misleading information, e.g., a listing of areas of practice, if the in-
formation also may be presented in a way that is not deceptive.
455 U.S. at 203.
107. Id. at 205.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 206. The Court offered a solution to the problem relating to the difficulty in
supervising mailings and handbills. By requiring the advertising lawyer to file his mailing
with the Advisory Committee the state would be able to exercise reasonable supervision over
the mailings.
110. A state-by-state survey as of January 1, 1979 showed 35 states had adopted liberal,
permissive advertising rules. State by State-Rules on Lawyer Advertising, NAT'L L.J. 14 (Oct.
15, 1979).
111. See supra note 3; See also Ethics Opinion No. 44.
112. The court in McLellan stated that "[we] recognize that advertising of any kind was/is
repulsive to attorneys of the so-called 'old school.' " 413 So. 2d at 709 n.2.
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
In McLellan, the primary issue to be decided by the court
sitting en banc was whether the tribunal's ruling totally suppress-
ing all telephone directory advertising was constitutional in light
of recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions. In discussing the Bates
decision, the court dealt with the qualifying language which pro-
vided for restraint in those cases where the advertising was false,
deceptive or misleading. Specifically, the court looked to foot-
note 26 of Bates, where it was stated: "If the information is not
misleading when published in a telephone directory, it is difficult
to see why it becomes misleading when published in a
newspaper."113 The court impliedly and quite logically turned the
phrase to read, "if the information is not misleading when published
in the newspaper, it is difficult to see why it becomes misleading
when published in the telephone directory."
The court also used the R.M.J. decision to emphasize the
states' ability to restrain this type of advertising while conceding
that the boundaries of that authority only extend to a furtherance
of substantial state interests and not to absolute prohibitions.11'
A collateral issue interposed by the Bar, and summarily dealt with
by the court, involved the Bar's contention that allowing the adver-
tisement that "the first conference is free" could lead to situations
found unacceptable in Ohralik,"5 such as misrepresentation and
overreaching. 1 6 The court addressed this issue by pointing to the
facts and findings of the Complaints Tribunal which found that
"[iut is not contended or even suggested that the respondent [ap-
pellant McLellan] is guilty of any misconduct including
misrepresentations, overreaching or asserting any undue influence
upon clients or prospective clients."1 7 The court also compared
the Bates advertisement with McLellan's and found the Bates
advertisement larger in size and more aggressive than
McLellan's."'
In conclusion, the court found that since the advertisement
was not inherently likely to deceive, and was far from self-
laudatory when compared to the Bates advertisement, a blanket
prohibition of all advertising in the Yellow Pages of the telephone
directory was unconstitutional, as were the sections of the Code
of Professional Responsibility dealing with this issue. 19
113. 433 U.S. at 372 n.26.
114. See supra notes 106 and 107 and accompanying text.
115. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
116. Brief of Appellee at 5, 6, 413 So. 2d 705.
117. 413 So. 2d at 707.
118. Compare Appendix I with Appendix II, this Note.
119. 413 So. 2d at 708-09.
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CONCLUSION
The McLellan decision was logically correct. The correct-
ness stems from the long line of cases that whittled away at the
fear of losing dignity, honor and tradition should lawyer adver-
tising be allowed. The logic of the McLellan decision lies in the
fact that if the U.S. Supreme Court in Bates allowed an adver-
tisement much more aggressive and influential to appear in a
newspaper where only telephone directory advertising was per-
mitted, then afortiori a simpler advertisement in a telephone direc-
tory where only newspaper advertising is permitted is likewise
allowable. Therefore, the court in McLellan did not expand the
advertising limits, but in essence, judicially confirmed a pre-
existing right implied but not written within the advertising rules.
Dennis J. Gruttadaro
Appendix I
CONSULTATIONS
4 TO 6 P.M.
MON. WED. FRI.
WILLIAM E. McLELLAN III
ATTORNEY-AT-LAW
THE FIRST CONFERENCE IS FREE
LICENSED IN MISSISSIPPI
SINCE 1968
[969-67511
SUITE 420 BARNETT 8LOG
220 S. PRESIOENT ST
JACKSON MISSISSIPPI
Appendix II
AOVIEATI5LMNT
DO YOU NEED
A LA WYER?
LEGAL SERVICES
AT VERYREASONABLEFEES
" Divorce or legal separation- -uncontested
'both spouSeS sign papetSj
1.15 00 plus 120 00 coirt 1,Mh54 lee
" Prep r tion of all court papers and instr c*
tions on how to do Four own simple
uncontested divorCe
110000
" Adoption. -uncontested severance proceeding
1225 00 plus 40D0n.1,0jely s10 00 publca.
lon CosI
* Uaniruptcy..non-business. no contested pro.
cedings
ninivdual
1250 00 plus 155 00 court firIts foe
Wfie and Husbind
.
1300 00 plus $110 00 Court tiling fee
* Change of Name
19S.00 plus 1200 0 court tiling tee
Infermation regarding other tiles Of cases
furnishe on request
Legal Clinic of Bates & O'Steen
617 Nerth rd street
Phoenis. Aribone INH
Telephoine to21 n2 -Is
Appendix III
LAW OFFICES
CI4UOMALLOV PL.AZA - SU.ITS[ 1404
A120 SOUTH CENTAL AVENUE
T. LOUIS UCLAYTON, MISSTOURI 63106721-1221
